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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Denmark  implemented  a major  reform  of the administrative  and  political  structure  in  2007  when  the
previous  13 counties  were  merged  into  ﬁve  new  regions  and  the  number  of  municipalities  was  reduced
from  271  to 98.  A main  objective  was  to create  administrative  units  that  were  large  enough  to  support
a  hospital  structure  with  few  acute  hospitals  in  each  region  and  to centralize  specialized  care  in fewer
hospitals.  This  paper  analyses  the reorganization  of the somatic  hospital  sector  in Denmark  since  2007,
discusses  the  mechanisms  behind  the  changes  and  analyses  hospital  performance  after  the  reform.  The
reform  focused  on improving  acute services  and  quality  of  care.  The  number  of acute  hospitals  was
reduced  from  about  40–21  hospitals  with  new  joint  acute  facilities,  which  include  emergency  care  wards.
The  restructuring  and  geographical  placement  of  acute  hospitals  took  place  in a  democratic  process
subject  to central  guidelines  and  requirements.  Since  the  reform,  hospital  productivity  has  increased
by  more  than 2 per  cent  per  year  and  costs  have  been  stable.  Overall,  indicators  point to  a  successfuleywords:
overnment health policy
tate and local taxation
tate and local budgets and expenditures
reform.  However,  it has also  been  criticized  that  some  people  in remote  areas  feel  “left  behind”  in  the
economic  development  and  that  hospital  staff  are  under  increased  workload  pressure.  Concurrent  with
the centralization  of  hospitals  municipalities  strengthened  their  health  service  with  an  emphasis  on
prevention  and  health  promotion.
utho
tate and local government – health
linical specialization
cute health care
© 2018  The  A
. Background and aim
Denmark implemented a major reform of the administrative and
olitical structure in 2007 [1,2,3,32,41]. At that time, the country
ad three administrative levels – the state, county and municipal –
ach with the authority to levy taxes. The background for the reform
as that the administrative structure was seen as being composed
f too many small units at both the municipal and county levels to
e able to provide services of a satisfactory quality. In particular,
t was a cause for concern that hospitals with a small volume of
urgical patients were not able to provide surgery of a high quality
ue to limited surgeon experience [35]. Moreover, having larger
unicipal units would allow for a decentralization of tasks from
he state or the regions. Bigger units were seen as a condition for
etter prioritization and coordination of activities in the public sec-
or. Some stakeholders found that three administrative levels with
he authority to levy taxes in a small country of just 5.6 million
 Open Access for this article is made possible by a collaboration between Health
olicy and The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
∗ Corresponding author at: University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1153
openhagen K, Denmark.
E-mail address: kv@ifs.ku.dk (K. Vrangbæk).
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168-8510/© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articl
.0/).r(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
inhabitants were too many, and cost savings could be achieved by
reducing the number of levels to two [1,2,32].
In brief, the aim of the reform related to health care was three-
fold: 1) to create larger administrative units at the second level
(former county level), which would allow the creation of larger hos-
pital units and were expected to increase the quality of treatments.
Likewise, an increase in size would allow municipalities to take
responsibility for more tasks related to health; 2) to increase efﬁ-
ciency through administrative rationalization; and 3) to strengthen
the governance of health care, including governmental regulation
of the health care sector. More speciﬁc aims for the health care
sector were formulated by the National Board of Health (NBoH),
including the central planning of specialties (hospital service plan-
ning), improved acute services with joint acute facilities, increased
local prevention and health promotion as well as a nationwide elec-
tronic patient record system [2]. The principle of easy and equal
access for everyone was  maintained as a fundamental value.
The reform merged the previous 13 counties (and three munic-
ipalities with county functions) into ﬁve new regions rather than
abolishing the second administrative level, and it reduced the num-
ber of municipalities from 271 to 98. The reform also changed the
responsibility and ﬁnancing of health care, and the authority of the
national level to regulate the health care sector through the NBoH
was strengthened [15] (Box 1).
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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Box 1: Hospitals.
The hospital sector in Denmark is predominantly public. Fol-
lowing a structural reform in 2007, each of the ﬁve regional
governments owns and operates the public hospitals within its
region besides contracting with general practitioners and other
health providers outside hospitals. One hospital in each region
serves as a university hospital. Having ownership allows the
regions to operate their hospitals in a coordinated fashion with
respect to specialization and geographical placement as well
as relations to providers outside hospitals, such as general
practitioners. A substantial share of hospital care is delivered
as outpatient care within the hospitals. Hospitals are ﬁnanced
through a mix  of global budgets and case-based payments
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ibased upon a DRG system (grouping of patients into diagnosis
related groups).
While the policy process behind the Structural Reform has been
nalysed elsewhere [32,1,2], there are important outstanding ques-
ions about the implementation and outcomes of the reform. The
ims of this paper are to analyse the reorganization of the somatic
ospital sector in Denmark since 2007, to present evidence about
he performance of hospitals after the reform and to discuss the
echanisms behind the changes. This is highly relevant, as many
uropean countries are considering centralization reforms as a way
o improve the efﬁciency of hospital services.
It is well known that top-down reforms may  be stiﬂed or have
nexpected consequences at the decentral levels. Institutional the-
ry points to path dependency, incrementalism and “status quo
ias” [4]. This is based on risk aversion, uncertainty [4] and the per-
asiveness of norms and routines tied to the existing structures [5].
ested interests and formalized interest group representation can
urther bias the political economy against radical changes [6]. Fur-
hermore, general ambitions can be stiﬂed in the implementation
hase if the choice of instruments is inappropriate, or the there is
 lack of will or ability to follow through on central decisions [7,8].
In our case, we investigate whether the potential barriers against
ospital reorganizations have indeed affected the outcome of the
eform. We  argue that the end result depends on how the reform
nd the following processes affected the political economy for
egional decision-makers and whether reorganizations are backed
y sufﬁcient political pressure and convincing narratives [6].
. Methods
Our investigation is based on descriptive statistics, publicly
vailable documents and the scattered evaluations of reform
spects that have been published so far. While there have been con-
urrent health policy changes over the past decade, the Structural
eform provided the institutional infrastructure for such subse-
uent changes. It is therefore reasonable to argue that mergers and
eorganizations and, more indirectly, the performance of Danish
ospitals can be related to the Structural Reform and the institu-
ional governance conditions created by the reform.
An independent, comprehensive evaluation of the Structural
eform has never been conducted due to the complexity of the
eform (covering all parts of the welfare state) and the many simul-
aneous changes. The government concluded in a report in 2013
42] that the reform was generally a success. However, further
fforts were needed with regard to ﬁnancing models to support
ntegrated care (revision of the municipal co-ﬁnancing), health
greements and follow-up with general practitioners, integrated
T systems, prevention (municipalities), rehabilitation (municipal-
ties) and psychiatry.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First we  look at
nstruments and processes of the reform, stakeholders, evidence forh Policy 122 (2018) 321–328
reform decisions and the role of the municipalities after the reform.
We then present detailed information about developments after
the reform with regards to: hospital investments, reorganization
of acute care, ﬁnancing and hospital payment schemes, digital-
ization and quality control. Finallywe present evidence about the
performance of the Danish hospitals after the reform. We  discuss
the political and institutional conditions that facilitated the reor-
ganization of hospitals in Denmark before we present the overall
conclusion.
3. Results
3.1. Instruments and processes
With the administrative structure in place an important task
at the regional level was  to redesign hospital structure and func-
tions. The reform increased the power of the NBoH and centralized
the economic power to the national level. This meant that the pur-
suit of the general aims of the reform became strongly inﬂuenced
by national authorities. While the NBoH issued general guidelines
with respect to specialty planning, an important task for the demo-
cratically elected politicians in each regional board was  to initiate
local specialty planning to comply with national guidelines. The
specialty planning by the NBoH included a deﬁnition of which spe-
cialties should be present at the regional level, and which should be
available at a smaller number of hospitals to serve patients across
regions. In this process it was decided which specialties should be
present in regions at which hospitals, which hospital were to have
changed functions and which should be closed. Compliance with
the guidelines was  a prerequisite to receive funding for the renewal
of hospitals, and this gave the regions an incentive to comply. The
process took place over several years and involved negotiations
between each region and the NBoH before a ﬁnal plan was issued
by the NBoH. The clinical community was involved in the process by
participating in a dialogue with each region and also at the national
level by guiding the NBoH with respect to what was feasible for a
country like Denmark [35: 123]. Although it was a difﬁcult process
to change the hospital infrastructure, the OECD notes that “there
was a remarkable level of consensus and goodwill surrounding
these efforts in Denmark” and suggests that this may reﬂect the fact
that the “regions found themselves uniquely responsible for health
and more ﬁnancially dependent on the centre” [35: 120–121].
3.2. Stakeholders
The hospital reform was  part of a larger administrative reform
that inﬂuenced all parts of the public sector. Main stakeholders
in the process of re-organizing hospitals were politicians and pol-
icy makers, public authorities like the NBoH, Danish Regions (the
national association of regions), Local Government Denmark (the
national association of municipalities), health care professionals,
hospital managers, patient associations and the population at large.
The role of some of the stakeholders changed in connection with
the reform: The NBOH got a stronger role in shaping the hospital
landscape, while the power of the regions was  reduced as they were
left without authority to levy taxes and with less room for prioritiz-
ing compared to the situation of the former counties which could
prioritize between health care and other public services.
3.3. Evidence and information
The evidence in the international literature about the size of spe-
cialized hospitals was mixed [35]. However, some guidance could
be found by using registers of routinely collected hospital data on
volume and quality, and such data, besides assessments by clinical
experts, were used by the NBoH to formulate guidelines. Changing
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Box 2: National Board of Health.
In 2016 National Board of Health (NBoH)changed its name to
the Danish Health Authority (DHA). It is the supreme health pro-
fessional authority in Denmark. The authority is placed directly
under the Ministry of Health, and its main tasks include overall
activities related to health promotion, prevention and treat-
ment of diseases. It has a central role in specialty planning
which involves planning of the hospital sector and division
of tasks among various types of hospitals and their level of
specialization. A distinction is made between basic hospital
functions and highly specialized functions. The authority spec-
iﬁes the requirements for highly specialized functions and has
the authority to approve the placement of highly specialized
functions at hospitals in the regions. The term NBoH will be
used throughout the paper.
Box 3: Health centres.
Municipalities can establish health centres which can provide
health services by various providers. These centres vary with
respect to structure and functions, but the main purpose is to
provide routine health services to citizens. Medical doctors are
normally not attached. The centres can focus on patients with
chronic conditions which require frequent control, marginal-
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erceptions about localism and beneﬁt of scale were behind the
eneral Structural Reform [1] and were also present in the debates
bout hospital infrastructure. The government used expert com-
ittees to establish criteria for the optimal catchment areas and to
eview regional plans [11,12] (Box 2).
.4. The role of the municipalities
Compared to the former counties, the new regions’ area of
esponsibility was narrowed to, in particular, planning and oper-
ting hospitals as well as contracting with providers practising in
rivate clinics outside hospitals, such as GPs, dentists, physiother-
pists and medical specialists. The enlarged municipalities took
ver the responsibility for health care in the community from the
ounties, but with increased emphasis on health promotion, pri-
ary prevention, rehabilitation and care for patients with chronic
onditions. Mandatory agreements between regions and munici-
alities were introduced to enhance coordination with regard to
dmissions, discharge, rehabilitation and capacity.
.5. Changes to the hospital structure after the reform
Following the reform, the hospital structure changed from con-
isting of 40 public hospitals in 82 locations in 2007 to having 21
ospitals in 68 locations in 2016 [11]. Twenty-one of these are acute
ospitals, while others treat elective patients. Some hospitals were
losed, others were transformed into health centres run by the local
unicipalities (Box 3).
Hospital treatment in Denmark can take place at two  levels,
ither the general or the specialized level. Specialized treatment is
eﬁned as either a regional treatment function or a highly special-
zed treatment function. The NBoH has deﬁned 36 specialties [38].
reatment at the general level comprises 90 per cent of all treat-
ents. Examples are general medicine and uncomplicated surgery. regional function is typically placed at 1–3 locations in a region,
nd collaboration among the units is required. Examples are var-
ous types of diagnostic scanning, radiation therapy and vascular
urgery. Treatment at the highly specialized level is typically placedh Policy 122 (2018) 321–328 323
at 1–3 locations in the country. Hence, specialized treatment has
been centralized at a few hospitals, in some cases only one hospi-
tal. Examples are surgery for lung cancer, heart surgery, transplants
or treatment of serious burns. When deciding the level of care,
the NBoH uses a number of criteria, such as the capacity of clin-
ical services, patient volume, experience and expertise, access to
required technical facilities, documented clinical quality and others
[35: 123]. Adjustments are made annually by the NBoH [55]. Hospi-
tals that carry out specialised functions also treat less complicated
cases. In summary, there has been a centralization of hospital activ-
ities, both within regions and nationwide, with respect to highly
specialized care, which is primarily guided by quality requirements.
It has been recommended that efforts are made to increase a
pathway oriented hospital structure which allows an interdisci-
plinary collaboration in treatment and care due to an increased
share of patients with chronic conditions [12]. The establishment
of new joint acute wards (see below) is an example of a pathway-
oriented structure.
3.6. Urgent and emergency care
According to the recommendations of the NBoH [11], all urgent
contacts to hospitals (except emergencies) must be based on tele-
phone guidance and referral from a call centre. The call centre can
either give guidance over the telephone or refer the patient to an
urgent care clinic run by GPs or to an urgent and emergency hospital
facility (joint acute facility or emergency clinic, see Box 4). This pro-
cedure was  implemented in all regions in 2014 and is either carried
out by a nurse or a general practitioner who receives the calls from
acute patients [9]. The system is meant to ensure that patients are
treated at the lowest effective cost level. The system has not been
evaluated, but some doctors have been strongly opposed to placing
nurses in the front line at the acute telephone. The result has been
that nurses carry out this function in one region while other regions
use GPs.
One of the key ideas in the reform was to abandon the previ-
ous dispersed emergency and urgent care units and, instead, to
establish urgent care in fewer hospitals with so-called “joint acute
facilities” which have a broad spectrum of specialized clinical com-
petences and specialized equipment at their disposal. In principle,
this allows patients to be treated by specialists at an early stage of
their contact with a hospital and facilitates better coordination of
diagnostics and care for patients with multiple health problems. In
addition to higher quality this is also expected to save resources [9].
According to the guidelines issued by the NBoH, an acute hospital
should cover an area with between 200,000 and 400,000 citizens,
depending on population density, to ensure a sufﬁcient volume.
Acute patients made up 72 per cent of all hospital admissions in
2015. At present, 17 acute hospitals out of 21 have created a joint
acute facility in one physical location [9]. In spite of resistance from
some parts of the medical profession [10], a specialty in emergency
care was  approved by the NBoH in 2017 [38].
Concurrent with the restructuring of the acute hospital service,
pre-hospital services were improved signiﬁcantly by the introduc-
tion of acute care ambulances with improved equipment as well
as vehicles with emergency care doctors to assist the ambulance
crews. Emergency care helicopters cover the ﬁve regions 24 h a
day and are placed at three different locations [17]. Each region
has taken measures to secure coherence between the emergency
pre-hospital services and the emergency reception. One tool is an
electronic Pre-Hospital Patient Record, which can monitor patients
while they are in the ambulance and send information directly to
the receiving hospital, so that the patient can be stabilized and the
hospital staff is prepared when the ambulance arrives [18]. To han-
dle minor problems some regions have established local urgent care
clinics.
324 T. Christiansen, K. Vrangbæk / Healt
Box 4: Joint acute facilities.
A joint acute facility is a hospital ward that receives acute
patients suffering from all kinds of health problems. The facili-
ties include former emergency wards. That means that there is
only one entrance to acute health care irrespective of diag-
nosis. It is required that a number of specialists from the
most common areas of specialty are present at the facility or
present at the hospital and can be called upon when needed
all hours. The purpose of this structure is to increase effec-
tiveness in diagnostics and treatment and discharge patients
without unnecessary delay. Patients whose care takes more
than 48 h will be transferred to a specialized hospital depart-
ment [11,23,34]. Besides the acute facility, some acute hospitals
also run trauma centres for serious traumas, and general prac-
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ttitioners run out-of-hours’ service, typically on the premises of
a hospital.
It has been estimated that about 12 per cent of the population
ill have more than 30 km to the nearest acute hospital in 2020
37]. Some of these live on islands and have a long travel time to
he nearest hospital by ordinary means of transportation, but if the
mergency is life threatening the emergency helicopter service can
e used (Box 4).
.7. Hospital investment
Following the reform, a major government investment scheme
as launched. The government has set aside an extra 25 billion
KK for investment in a new hospital structure on top of ordinary
nvestment grants for the period 2009–2018. In addition, regions
an ﬁnance investments for 15 billion DKK from their own budgets
12].
New hospitals are currently under construction in all ﬁve
egions in addition to comprehensive projects to renew or enlarge
xisting hospitals. The renewal or creation of new hospitals reﬂects
he plan to gather specialties in fewer hospitals and to establish
oint acute wards, which means that fewer patients will be admit-
ed to specialized wards before being discharged. In general, the
ospitals under construction will have a smaller numbers of beds
ompared to the ones they substitute, as the effectiveness of treat-
ents as well as the municipal services are expected to improve,
hereby allowing earlier discharge and preventing “unnecessary”
dmissions to hospital. The Government’s Expert Panel [12] esti-
ated an increase of 50 per cent in the number of ambulatory
isits and, corresponding to this, a decrease of about 20 per cent
n the demand for beds based on previous trends and estimates
ith respect to the need for treatments, capacity utilization and
tandards for space. In their estimates, the panel was cautious not
o overstate the need due to the economic implications. A structure
ith 25–30 per cent single-bed wards was planned [12]. However,
he estimates by the panel have later turned out to overstate the
eed for beds [13]. At the same time, budgets have apparently been
oo optimistic, as the costs of many projects have increased and
ome construction plans have had to be amended by reduction in
acilities, space or quality. Critics have also faulted the fact that the
onstruction takes place in all regions at the same time rather than
tepwise, which would reduce the demand for scarce construction
esources, limit price increases and allow for a learning process
14].
.8. Financing regional health careRegional health care is ﬁnanced by a mix  of government grants
about 81 per cent), municipal co-payment (about 18 per cent of
he total health care budget) and activity based funding (about 1h Policy 122 (2018) 321–328
per cent) to reward extra activity. The total government grants are
negotiated between the government and Danish Regions before
approval in Parliament and being included in the Fiscal Act. The
grant is then allocated to each region on the basis of a formula
which includes objective criteria (demography and socio-economic
characteristics) which cannot be inﬂuenced by the regions.
The government has demanded a productivity increase of 2 per
cent per year (extra production with an unchanged budget) by the
hospitals as measured at the regional level. This instrument was  in
place in 2003 (before the reform) and has been maintained, but was
raised from 1.5 to 2 per cent in 2006 [35]. Marginal increases of bud-
gets have been motivated by speciﬁc initiatives like, for example,
intensiﬁed cancer treatment (the so-called “Cancer package”), heart
treatment (the “Heart package”) or extra costs due to expensive
new hospital medicine.
Municipal co-payment for treatment of their own citizens was
introduced in 2007 as part of the administrative reform. The pur-
pose was to incentivize municipalities to enhance prevention and
health promotion. The payment model will be changed in 2018 to
include age differentiation, where the highest payments are asso-
ciated with the usage of health care by the age groups that the
municipalities are expected to inﬂuence most easily (0–2, 65–79
and 80+ years) [19]. When the new structure was  established,
most municipalities needed to build their own capacity to handle
tasks related to prevention, rehabilitation and health promotion.
These tasks had previously been placed in the counties. However,
the extent of activities had to be increased in accordance with
the reform when the municipalities agreed to take responsibility
for these tasks. Their role with respect to care of patients after
discharge from hospitals was unchanged, and the shortening of
hospital stays and ensuring increased need for care in the home
or home municipality had taken place over a long period.
Treatments which are carried out in another region than the
patients’ home region, are paid for by the home region on the basis
of ofﬁcial DRG fees (fees based on diagnosis related groups) which
are updated and published annually by the NBoH.
3.9. Paying hospitals
Regions have been required to ﬁnance their hospitals partly on
the basis of activity measured in terms of DRGs (diagnosis related
groups) since before the reform. The rest is paid by global bud-
gets. A national recommendation of a 50-50 per cent split between
these payment modes was introduced in 2008 following the reform.
In practice, the requirement of a 2 per cent productivity increase
has been applied to each hospital and to each hospital department,
irrespective of their circumstances, and it has implied a produc-
tivity increase of about 30 per cent during the period 2003–2017.
This system has an inbuilt economic incentive to increase the num-
ber of procedures and thereby increase the DRG payments without
necessarily increasing quality and the health of the patients. There-
fore, some experimentation with other outcome measures related
to quality as deﬁned by each department has been initiated [20],
and Danish Regions and the government have agreed to analyse
other forms of hospital governance [36], in particular with inclusion
of quality measures in the allocation formulas. Capital investments
are negotiated separately between the government and Danish
Regions.
Apart from municipal co-payment and the removal of regional
politicians’ authority to balance taxation and service level, no spe-
ciﬁc ﬁnancial instruments to steer the reform were introduced.
However, there has been a general tendency to increase govern-
ment control of both activities and economy as exempliﬁed by the
“Budget law” from 2014, which introduced automatic sanctions if
municipalities and regions spend above their budgets (see below).
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.10. Quality assurance
Quality assurance has been part of the Danish health care system
or a number of years. It was initiated by the NBoH in collabora-
ion with clinical specialty societies before the reform [43]. Danish
ospitals were accredited according to a strategy for quality devel-
pment in the hospital sector until the end of 2015 using criteria
rom a Danish Quality Model (DKKM) [43]. The accreditation was
erminated due to – among others – administrative costs that were
erceived too high compared to the outcome [47]. A new pro-
ramme  focusing on a smaller number of national goals combined
ith locally deﬁned speciﬁc goals was launched by the Ministry of
ealth in 2015 [46]. The national goals include increased value for
atients (i.e., better health and increased quality as experienced by
he patients) and lower costs per treated citizen. The programme
resupposes a new approach to quality assurance, and the empha-
is has changed from process to health improvements; inclusion of
he preferences of patients; increased use of data on quality, activ-
ty and costs; and improved management and leadership. Finally,
he programme recommended the use of ﬁnancial incentives to
upport quality, in contrast to the predominant focus on activity as
mplied by the traditional regional payment of hospitals.
The new quality indicators will be integrated into the electronic
ublishing system, which has existed in different forms since the
arly 1990s. A website can be accessed at www.esundhed.dk [48].
his website also links to publications of patient satisfaction data
LUP) [45]. Danish Regions already tracks and publishes develop-
ents according to the new indicators [49, 57].
More than 60 nationwide clinical databases have been endorsed
y the NBoH and are maintained by each specialty in addition to a
ecurrent nationwide survey of patient satisfaction [45]. In follow-
p to the planning of specialties, the NBoH monitors each specialty
n the basis of registers [44]. The regions have initiated a strategy
o get feedback from citizens based on their preferences [46].
.11. Electronic patient records
Electronic patient records (EPR) were gradually developed
efore 2000 by local initiatives. These initiatives created “IT islands”
f systems that did not communicate (well) together. However, in
pite of government strategies, the development was  slow, which
ave rise to criticism by the National Audit Ofﬁce [53]. The gov-
rnment formulated a new electronic strategy in 2007 [51] and
enewed it in 2013 [50]. The strategy included the development
f the EPR, which is deﬁned as a clinical information system that
upports the whole process of diagnostics, treatment and care for a
atient. It includes modules with basic patient information, notes,
rescription of medicine, appointment and requests for tests or
xaminations and their results. The EPR system has been almost
ully implemented at Danish hospitals in 2017, and the systems
ave been harmonized within each region [53]. With the EPR in
lace the staffs in a regional health care sector and the municipal-
ties therein have easy access to updated information of relevance
or diagnostics, treatment or care for a given patient. The sys-
em also allows patient information from hospitals to be sent to
he patient’s own GP. The communication between systems across
egions still needs improvement, which is of importance when a
atient is treated in another region than his or her home region.
Citizens have easy access to all kinds of health information at
he internet portal www.sundhed.dk [48]. They can also get access
o their own health data and to messages using a personal identiﬁ-
ation system with PIN codes. A joint medical record [52], which is
ne of the modules of the EPR, includes information on medications.
harmacies use the facility when receiving electronic prescriptions
nd delivering medicine to patients. Booking of ambulatory visits
an also be made by patients. Finally, the use of telemedicine forh Policy 122 (2018) 321–328 325
patients with chronic conditions is increasing. It allows patients
to be monitored while staying in their home rather than paying
ambulatory visits.
An important advantage of using EPR is that it is fast and reduces
the risk of errors that used to occur in connection with paper
records. Access is regulated by law and staff members are only
authorized to read information from the patients they treat [54].
3.12. Activity and performance
Fig. 1 shows the development of selected key indicators
related to health care during 2007–2015. Hospital productivity has
increased substantially, although the actual increases have been
uneven over the years with an average increase of 3 per cent
between 2011 and 2015 [55]. The sickness absence of staff mem-
bers and waiting times for planned surgery have decreased (except
in 2008 when there was a strike among nurses). Life expectancy
has been relatively low in Denmark mostly due to a risky life style
(high consumption of tobacco and alcohol), but during the period
2006–2007 to 2015–2016 it increased by 2.9 years to 78.8 years for
men and by 2.3 years to 82.8 for women [39]. Heart mortality as
one outcome indicator has decreased by 1/3.
Total health care expenditure (including private payment) as a
share of GDP increased from 9.3 to 10.6 per cent during 2007–2015.
Total regional health care expenditure in 2014 was  equal to 21.0
billion USD (74 per cent of total public health care expenditures).
Of these, hospitals accounted for 75.1 per cent [40],
Since the establishment of the regions, budgets have gradually
become subject to stronger control. A Budget Act in force since
2014 has introduced speciﬁc budget ceilings in the public sector
for the subsequent years. The result of such hard budget constraints
has been that total regional and municipal operating expenses per
citizen have been stable in ﬁxed prices since 2009 [22].
Administrative costs for hospitals have been stable at about 5
per cent over the period, which may  be ascribed to the single-payer
system making the handling of payment easier as well as central-
ization of some common functions. Danish health care expenditure
as a share of GDP is slightly below the average of 21 “old” OECD
countries when (long term) care in the municipal sector is omit-
ted (8.4 per cent for Denmark compared to 8.7 per cent for OECD
countries) [21]. Part of this may  be ascribed to the new structure,
while another part may  be attributed to an ongoing trend towards
applying public management tools to promote frugality at all levels.
Table 1 shows the changes from 2007 to 2015 inpatient admis-
sions, visits and procedures. It testiﬁes to changes in the hospital
structure and the mode of treatment with increased activity, espe-
cially in ambulatory care, shorter waiting times and shorter length
of stay.
The number of geographical hospital locations as well as acute
hospital facilities has decreased substantially. Most of these loca-
tions were previously run jointly with another hospital. After
closure some of these facilities have been transformed into health
clinics.
The composition of staff in somatic and psychiatric hospitals
changed between 2007 and 2015 [24]. While total full time employ-
ment increased by 10 per cent, the number of hospital doctors
increased by 19 per cent (consultants by 26 per cent), nurses by
13 per cent and other professional health care staff by 19 per cent,
while the number of social and health care assistants was reduced
by 17 percent. This reﬂects the increased specialization of hospi-
tal organizations. In spite of the increase in professional staff there
is growing criticism about high workload and stress particularly
among nursing staff [29].
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Fig. 1. Indices of development in hospital productivity, life expectancy, sickness absenc
employed in regions and municipalities. Life expectancy is for the whole population.
Source: [21].
Table 1
Key indicators of development of regional hospital structure and performance.
2007–2015 (or nearest year).
2007 2015
Employment, full time equivalent, somatic and
psychiatric
Doctors 13,109 15,632
Nurses 31,472 35,622
Other health care personnel 11,332 13,501
Social and health care assistants 11,725 9762
Total employed, full time equivalents 67,637 74,516
Prescribed number of beds, somatic 15,835 13,299 (2)
Number of admitted somatic patients, 1000 673 677
Outpatient visits, somatic
Number of ambulatory patients, 1000 2407 2654
Number of ambulatory visits, 1000 10,035 13,278
Productivity index, all public hospitalsa 100 117 (3)
Length of stay, days 3.9 3.1 (1)
Day surgery, pct. of eligible actually performed 72 (2) 77 (5)
Number of surgery patients, 1000 508 (6) 556 (5)
Waiting times for planned surgery, days 66 (4) 47
Sources: [21,23,11,24,25,26,27,28].
Notes:.
(1) Year 2011; (2) Year 2014; (3) Until year 2014; (4) Year 2009; (5) Year 2012; (6)
Year  2008.
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how the reform has affected the performance of hospitals. Finally,a Including a decrease in 2007–2008 of 3.2 per cent due to a strike in 2008. Pro-
uctivity increased by 16 per cent 2009–2013.
. Discussion
.1. What were the political and institutional conditions that
acilitated the reorganization of hospitals in Denmark?
The Structural Reform changed the balance of power in the
ultilevel governance relationship between the regions and the
overnment. The regions were presented as a potentially tempo-
ary solution and have been forced to constantly prove themselves
y delivering decisions that conform to the policy signals from the
ational level [1,32]. Centralization of tax funding for health care
nd increased powers to the NBoH further underlined the shift in
ower.
The importance of changes in the political-institutional land-
cape is clear in the process of developing new hospital plans in the
egions. The new hospital structures were decided by the regional
oards in a political process according to central guidelines and
ere subject to approval at the national level. For many people, the
losure of local hospitals meant that they now had a longer distance
o acute hospital services. This generated a heated public debate
nd protests in some areas before the ﬁnal decisions were made.
he protests had their origin in concerns about access to emer-e and waiting time for surgery 2007–2015. Note: Sickness Absence is absence by
gency care, loss of jobs and a more general sentiment in parts of
the population outside the large towns of being “left behind” by the
economic development. In some cases the NBoH used its power to
overrule a regional decision due to in-optimal population size [55].
In most other cases the regions made signiﬁcant efforts to com-
ply with national guidelines to avoid national intervention. This
can partly be explained by pressure from key government ofﬁcials
stating that the legitimacy and long term survival of the regions
were linked to their ability to deliver decisions in spite of protests
from key stakeholder groups within the regions.
A complementary explanation is that the political landscape
within the regions changed with the reform. Larger regions meant
that voter constituencies changed. This made it easier for regional
politicians to balance the resistance in areas where hospitals were
closed with the support in areas where new hospital buildings
were placed. Furthermore, in many cases the regional politicians
sweetened the bitterness of having to close down local hospitals
by converting them into other types of health facilities.
The political-institutional changes are supported by changes in
rhetoric and shared understandings. Changing perceptions about
localism and beneﬁts of scale were behind the general Structural
Reform [1] and can also be seen in the debate about hospital infras-
tructure. The government used expert committees to establish
criteria for the optimal catchment areas and to review regional
plans [11,12]. Proponents of centralization pointed to the wave of
mergers in the private sector and to suboptimal performance in
some smaller hospitals. Interest groups among health care profes-
sionals and patients tended to accept the idea of quality beneﬁts
of scale, and the ofﬁcial position of the Doctor’s Association was
to support the centralization. Although there were ﬁerce protests
in some local communities, the population in general accepted the
rhetoric about gaining quality by sacriﬁcing proximity, probably
because the media gave examples of quality ﬂaws at low-volume
hospitals and because media also reported that individuals would
prefer the best treatment in serious cases, irrespective of distance.
The principle was  accepted in a political agreement between the
government and Danish Regions in 2006.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the question of whether the
implementation of the Structural Reform in 2007 led to a reorga-
nization of the hospital structure in Denmark. Secondly, we askedwe discussed how the reform facilitated decision-making to reor-
ganize the hospital sector in spite of resistance from stakeholders
among citizens local communities.
 Healt
s
a
r
s
c
t
l
r
e
l
a
a
i
t
p
w
a
d
p
p
t
i
c
t
r
h
s
t
D
c
t
a
c
c
w
t
l
i
q
s
h
b
f
b
B
l
i
c
t
c
p
d
r
i
R
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[T. Christiansen, K. Vrangbæk /
We  conclude that signiﬁcant reorganizations have taken place
ince 2007. The number of acute hospitals has been reduced from
bout 40–21, and emergency care services are being dramatically
e-organized into fewer centralized “joint acute care facilities” with
pecialist doctors in the front line. Medical specialties have been
entralized at fewer hospitals to achieve an increase in quality. At
he same time, a major government investment scheme has been
aunched. New hospitals are currently under construction in all ﬁve
egions in addition to comprehensive projects to renew or enlarge
xisting hospitals.
The performance trends after the reform are positive. Activity
evels continue to increase, and the system has shown remark-
ble results in terms of ongoing productivity increases, although
ctual increases have been uneven over the years with an average
ncrease of 3 per cent between 2011 and 2015 [56], This is facili-
ated through ongoing national demands for productivity increases,
artially activity-based payments of hospitals and tight budgets,
hile quality is promoted through a number of quality assur-
nce programmes [33]. Waiting time trends are stable and quality
ata generally show improvements. Our observations of generally
ositive outcomes of the reform corroborate the conclusions in a
artial evaluation conducted by the government in 2013. However,
his report also pointed to weaknesses with regard to: ﬁnanc-
ng models to support integrated care (revision of the municipal
o-ﬁnancing), health agreements and follow-up with general prac-
itioners, integrated IT systems, prevention (municipalities) and
ehabilitation (municipalities), psychiatry. Several of these issues
ave subsequently been addressed as discussed above. Others are
till outstanding. No comprehensive independent evaluations of
he reform have been made.
From an international perspective, it is remarkable that the
anish regions were able to make democratic decisions about the
entralization and reorganization of the hospital structure after
he reform. This can be attributed to the role of the reform as
 catalyst for unfreezing the existing structure. The institutional
hanges introduced by the reform shifted the balance of power and
hanged the political economy for the regions and their politicians
ithin the multilevel governance system. This facilitated the cen-
ralization of the hospital structure in spite of sometimes ﬁerce
ocal resistance. The reforms were further supported by changes
n rhetoric and shared understandings about centralization and
uality.
Potential lessons for other countries are that reform efforts
hould carefully consider the political economy for the key stake-
olders and implementing agencies. Deliberate changes in the
alance of power between central and decentralized authorities can
acilitate implementation. In the Danish case this was  accomplished
y the centralization of ﬁnancing, stronger power to the National
oard of Health and by the persistent pressure applied by national
evel through threats of further structural reforms. The economic
ncentives related to the government investment scheme have also
ontributed to the regional reforms of their hospital structure.
The continuous requirement of 2 per cent increase in produc-
ivity is currently being challenged, and an ongoing discussion
oncerns how to incorporate quality measures in measuring hos-
ital performance. While the regions have focused on hospitals
uring the last decade, it is also necessary to further develop and
enew primary care and the collaboration among hospitals, special-
sts, general practitioners and municipalities.
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